A nonlinear substitution operation of bytes is the main strength factor of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and other modern cipher systems. In this paper we have presented a new simple algorithm to generate key-dependent S-boxes and inverse S-boxes for block cipher systems. The quality of this algorithm was tested by using NIST tests, and changing only one bit of the secret key to generate new key-dependent S-boxes. The fact that the S-boxes are key-dependent and unknown is the main strength of the algorithm, since the linear and differential cryptanalysis require known S-boxes. In the second section of the paper, we analyze S-boxes. In the third section we describe the key-dependent S-boxes and inverse S-boxes generation algorithm. Afterwards, we experimentally investigate the quality of the generated key-dependent S-boxes. Comparison results suggest that the key-dependent S-boxes have good performance and can be applied to AES.
Introduction
The growing number of communication users has led to increasing demand for security measures to protect data transmitted over open channels (Chen et al., 2008; Li et al., 2007; Sakalauskas, 2005) . Cryptography is the best method for data protection against active and passive fraud. A cipher system is a set of reversible transformations from the set M of a plaintext into the set C of a cipher text. Each transformation depends on a secret key and the ciphering algorithm. In the block cipher system, the plaintext is divided into blocks and the ciphering is carried out for the whole block (El-Ramly et al., 2001) .
Two general principles of block ciphers are confusion and diffusion. Confusion is transformation that changes the dependence of the statistics of the cipher text on the statistics of the plaintext. Diffusion is spreading of the influence of one plaintext bit to many cipher text bits with the intention to hide the statistical structure of the plaintext. In most cipher systems the confusion and diffusion are achieved by means of round repetition. Repeating a single round contributes to the cipher's simplicity (Masuda et al., 2006) . Modern
Substitution S-Boxes
The essential part of every block cipher is an S-box. To secure the cipher against these attacks, the nonlinearity of the S-box should satisfy the maximum input-output correlation, and the difference propagation probability should be minimum.
There are two ways to fight against the linear and differential cryptanalysis. The first one is to create S-boxes with low linear and differential probabilities. The other is to design the round transformation so that only trails with many active S-boxes would occur. The round transformation must be designed in such a way that differential steps with few active S-boxes would be followed by differential steps with many active S-boxes (Masuda et al., 2006) .
Substitution is a nonlinear transformation that performs confusion of bits. A nonlinear transformation is essential for every modern encryption algorithm and is proved to be a strong cryptographic primitive against the linear and differential cryptanalysis. Nonlinear transformations are implemented as lookup tables (S-boxes). An S-box with p input bits and q output bits is denoted as p → q. The DES uses eight 6 → 4 S-boxes. S-boxes are designed for software implementation on 8-bit processors. The block ciphers with 8 → 8 S-boxes are SAFER, SHARK, and AES. For processors with 32-bit or 64-bit words, S-boxes with more output bits provide a high efficiency. The Snefru, Blowfish, CAST, and SQUARE use 8 → 32 S-boxes. The S-boxes can be selected at random as in Snefru, and can be computed using a chaotic map, or have some mathematical structure over a finite Galois field. Examples of the last approach are SAFER, SHARK, and AES. S-boxes that depend on the key values are slower, but more secure than the key independent ones (Schneier, 1996b) . The use of the key independent chaotic S-boxes are analyzed in Jakimovski and Kocarev (2001) , in which the S-box is constructed with a transformation F ((X + K) mod M), where K is the key (Masuda et al., 2006) .
In AES, the S-box generate two transformations in the Galois fields GF(2) and GF(2 8 ). The S-box is a nonlinear transformation where each byte of the state is replaced by another byte using the substitution table. The first transformation is: an S-box finds the multiplication inverse of the byte in the field GF(2 8 ). Since it is an algebraic expression, it is possible to mount algebraic attacks. Hence, it is followed by an affine transformation. The affine transformation is chosen in order to make the SubBytes a complex algebraic expression while preserving the nonlinearity property. Both S-box transformations can be expressed in a matrix form as Hsiao et al. (2005 Hsiao et al. ( , 2006 
where the sign • is multiplication and the sign + is addition in the field GF(2 8 ). The 8 × 1 vector S ′ denotes the bits of the output byte after the S-box transformations. The inverse Sbox transformation can be get by multiplying both sides of Eq. (1) by M −1 and it performs the inverse affine transformation followed by the multiplicative inverse in GF(2 8 ):
The S-box elements (bytes) b must be invertible, i.e., invSbox(Sbox(b)) = b; must have no fixed elements, i.e., Sbox(b) = b; must have no complementary fixed elements, i.e., Sbox(b) =b, whereb is bitwise complement of b; Sbox must be not self inverse, i.e.,
The object of this proposal is a cipher using key-dependent S-boxes. The fact that S-boxes are unknown is one of the main strength of the cipher system, since both linear and differential cryptanalysis require the known S-boxes. If the S-boxes are generated from the key in sufficiently random fashion, each S-box has a high probability of being complete, possessing a fairly high nonlinearity. It is not apparent that the pseudorandom nature of the S-boxes introduces any weakness into the system. Ideal randomness of an S-box cannot be achieved. Ideal randomness is not mathematically possible because of the following reasons: the value of all elements in the S-box difference table should be even, since a ⊕ b = b ⊕ a. Since the S-box is bijective, the input difference of 0 will lead to an output difference of 0. So the element, corresponding to row = 0 and column = 0 in the difference table, will be 2 n and all other elements in row = 0 and column = 0 will be 0 (Sakthivel, 2001 ). 
Algorithm for Generation of
% Write the key-dependent substitution box values to Sboxm:
% Compute the key-dependent inverse substitution box values invSboxm:
10: for all i = 0, 1, . . . , 255 do
The initial substitution box Sbox 0 may be the AES substitution table rearranged according to the rows to the 256-size vector or the ordered numbers 0, 1, . . . , 255, or these numbers mixed in any order. In all these cases the sender and the receiver must know these boxes.
2. The length l of the secret key must be 16, 24, or 32 bytes as it is in AES, or the secret key may have any length.
There are six cases of applying the proposed algorithm. Define: ϕ -the proposed algorithm; f -the AES round keys generation function; Fthe AES ciphering algorithm; key -the secret key; Sbox 0 -the initial substitution box; Sboxm j -the j th key-dependent substitution box; ciphertext j -the result of ciphering round j ; ciphertext n = ciphertext; rk -the round keys; rk 0 = key, rk j , j = 1, 2, . . . , nthe j th round key; n -the number of ciphering rounds (in AES n = 10, 12, or 14).
Case 1: The algorithm generates a key-dependent substitution box Sboxm 0 for the given secret key key and for the initial substitution box Sbox 0 :
Case 2: In each ciphering round j we generate and use the substitution box Sboxm j , which depends on the round key rk j and on the modified key-dependent initial substitution box Sboxm 0 :
Case 3: In each ciphering round j we generate and use the key-dependent substitution box Sboxm j , which depends on the secret key key and on the key-dependent substitution box Sboxm j −1 :
Case 4: In each ciphering round j we generate and use the key-dependent substitution box Sboxm j , which depends on the round key rk j and on the key-dependent substitution box Sboxm j −1 :
Case 5: In each ciphering round j we generate and use key-dependent substitution box Sboxm j , which depends on the secret key key and on the key-dependent substitution box Sboxm j −1 . In addition, round keys rk depend on the secret key key and the key-dependent substitution box Sboxm j :
Case 6: In each ciphering round j we generate and use key-dependent substitution box Sboxm j , which depends on the round key rk j and on the key-dependent substitution box Sboxm j −1 . In addition, round keys rk depend on the secret key key and the key-dependent substitution box Sboxm j : 
Experimental Results and Discussion
We introduce the independency measure "ratio" of the S-box elements x as follows:
where corr(τ ) is the correlation function of the normalized S-box elements y:
in which mean is an arithmetic mean and std is a standard deviation. In Eq. (9) corr(0) = 0. The normalized ratio of (9) is:
where N is the length of the integer numbers. For AES S-box N = 256.
The normalized ratio depends on the interval length of the integer numbers. The AES S-box elements are integers from the interval [0, 255] . If we analyze only the interval [0, 255] (16 × 16 S-box), and suppose that the Matlab function randperm permutes the integer numbers "ideally", the normalized ratio is equal to 0.0443904 ± 0.0032, and can be used as an "ideal" ratio for the random 16 × 16 S-box. So, we use the normalized ratio as the independency measure of the integer numbers from the finite interval. Theoretically, in case the interval of the integer numbers is infinitely long, the normalized ratio for the independent integer numbers is equal to zero.
E
1. The aim is to verify the proposed S-box and inverse S-box generation algorithm. Consider the 128 bit length secret key in the hexadecimal form: key = {17, D5, 4C, 30, D6, 68, C2, 38, 49, D9, 22, 5B, 12, 55, 65, 20}.
We have generated the key-dependent S-box Sboxm and an inverse key-dependent S-box invSboxm, using the algorithm described in the paper (Case 1). The initial S-box was the AES S-box. The key-dependent S-box Sboxm is given in Table 1 , and the inverse keydependent S-box invSboxm is given in Table 2 . The normalized ratio of Sboxm elements is equal to 0.0432548 and is approximately equal to the "ideal" normalized ratio = 0.044390 for independent numbers generated by using the MATLAB function randperm. The S-box consists of all possible permuted 256 values from interval [0, 255] . During the encryption each byte is replaced by the corresponding byte from Table 1 . For example, byte 91 is replaced by byte EB. During the decryption process the byte EB is replaced by byte 91 (see Table 2 ). E 2. We have randomly generated 1000 keys and calculated 1000 keydependent S-boxes Sboxm, using the algorithm described in the paper (Case 1). The initial S-box was the AES S-box. The average of the normalized "ratio" of the 1000 keydependent S-boxes Sboxm elements is equal to 0.0440 ± 0.0030, while the normalized "ratio" of the AES S-box elements is 0.0433, i.e., they are approximately equal.
Averaged and normalized elements of 1000 key-dependent S-boxes Sboxm via S-box elements positions in the S-box, and averaged and normalized correlation function of 1000 key-dependent S-boxes are given in Fig. 1 .
3. One of the criteria to evaluate the quality of the block cipher is its suitability as a random number generator. That is, the evaluation of the cipher text using statistical tests should not provide any means by which we could computationally get them from the plaintext.
The following tests are based on NIST Special Publication 800-22rev1a (NIST, 2010), using statistical test suite, called sts-2.1.1. First tested ciphertext was generated using AES (Rijndael) algorithm with standard S-box, hereinafter referred as "Standard algorithm". Other tested ciphertext was generated using AES (Rijndael) algorithm with proposed modification (Case 1), hereinafter referred as "Modified algorithm". The evaluation reported in the paper focused on 128-bit keys. The 160 different types files were encrypted using Standard and Modified algorithms. The encrypted files were used as inputs to the 15 tests of NIST statistical suite. A total of 316408915 128-bit blocks were stored, processed and tested.
Both algorithms used identical plaintexts. This way ciphertext randomness can be checked with recommendations of Special Publication 800-22rev1a and also with each other. In this paper P values of 15 tests are presented, thus letting see which cipher text is more random (under assumption of randomness). The total number of tested sequences is 160, therefore results are statistically meaningful (NIST, 2010, Section 4.2.2). The averaged P values of the statistical tests for both algorithms are shown in Table 3 . Note that both algorithms passed all NIST statistical tests. Results show that tested ciphertext sequences are random and number of ones is close to the number of ones in a truly random sequence (Frequency test). The numbers of ones and zeros in ciphertext blocks are also close to the numbers of ones and zeros of random sequence (Block Frequency test). Most of other tests also show that tested ciphertext sequences are close to the random sequence (under assumption of randomness).
Some tests show bigger deviation from the results of truly random sequence. However, deeper analysis of all results shows that ciphertexts still are concluded as random. For example, the differences between f n and Expected Value (L) in the Universal test are smaller than 0.01, therefore ciphertexts are not significantly compressible and this confirms randomness. Delta values of Serial test are not very large and it means that significant uniformity of ciphertexts was not detected.
As the results of the above tests show, both algorithms create ciphertexts that can be considered as random sequences. Comparing P values of ciphertexts of the Standard and Modified algorithms, we can see that more P values are closer to 1/2 in the ciphertext of Modified algorithm (24 out of 46 P values of successful tests).
Of course, ciphertext strictly depends on the plaintext and the key, because AES algorithm is submissive to avalanche effect and slightly different plaintext will provide very different ciphertext, but that should not have significant impact on current results. Having this in mind we can conclude, that proposed modification of the S-box does not make AES algorithm worse, has no significant influence to the compression or other properties of the ciphertext, therefore it can be used in applications. 
Conclusion
One of the criteria to evaluate the quality of the block cipher is its suitability as a random number generator. That is, the evaluation of the ciphertext using statistical tests should not provide any means by which we could computationally get them from the plaintext. Modeling results show that tested ciphertext sequences are random and number of ones is close to the number of ones in a truly random sequence (Frequency test). The numbers of ones and zeros in ciphertext blocks are also close to the number of random sequence (Block Frequency test). Most of other tests also show that tested ciphertext sequences are close to the random sequence (under assumption of randomness). It has been established that for any change of the secret key, the structure of the key-dependent S-box will be changed essentially. The key-dependent S-boxes make block cipher algorithm resistant to linear and differential cryptanalysis. This algorithm will help to generate more secure block ciphers and will increase the security of the block cipher systems. The main advantage of such algorithm is that the huge number of S-boxes can be generated by changing secret key. The additional time needed to generate key-dependent S-boxes is negligible. As compared with algorithm in the paper Kazlauskas and Kazlauskas (2009) , this algorithm generates S-boxes about eight times faster.
Blokinių šifravimo sistemų S-lentelių priklausomų nuo rakto generavimo algoritmas
Kazys KAZLAUSKAS, Gytis VAICEKAUSKAS, Robertas SMALIUKAS AES ir kitų šiuolaikinių šifravimo algoritmų atsparumas labai priklauso nuo netiesinės baitų pakeitimo operacijos. Pasiūlytas naujas paprastas algoritmas, generuojantis priklausomas nuo slaptojo rakto baitų pakeitimo lenteles (S-lenteles), skirtas blokinėms šifravimo sistemoms. Algoritmo kokybė patikrinta naudojant NIST testus, keičiant vieną slaptojo rakto bitą. Straipsnio antrame poskyryje analizuojamos S-lentelės, trečiame -aprašomas algoritmas, o ketvirtame -eksperimentiškai tikrinama sugeneruotų lentelių kokybė.
